Research

Work in Progress

Working Papers

Partisanship as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

with B. Bühler  ·  2024

This paper provides a new perspective on why political leaders may adopt partisan positions and maintain them over time, even in the face of conflicting evidence. We study a stylized dynamic framework in which politicians are better informed than the voting public about an underlying state of the economy that determines the desirability of a given policy measure. Importantly, the issue itself is entirely non-partisan — everyone has the same policy preferences. Still, assuming that voters attach ideological labels to both candidates (e.g. through party affiliation) and available policy alternatives, we show that both sides may be caught in a partisan trap of self-fulfilling expectations: because voters expect the identity of officeholders to shape their political actions, politicians are tempted to act according to their perceived partisan identities, i.e., the latter act like 'sunspots' that determine subsequent policy choices only because voters think they do. We show that the resulting partisan equilibrium is one of political failure and policy persistence. We also consider some extensions to show robustness of the findings.

Externalities in Politicians' Malfeasance: Norms of Corruption

with G. Bobonis and X. Zhao  ·  CESifo Working Paper No. 11715, 2025  ·  Revise & resubmit, Journal of Development Economics

To what extent can anti-corruption measures serve to limit patronage and corrupt networks effectively and sustainably in clientelist societies with a prevailing norm of corruption? We develop a political agency model in which officeholders are motivated to reduce rent seeking behavior through re-election incentives operating via elections and audits (formal institutions), but also through reputational or self-image concerns that are influenced by the prevailing norm on corruption in their peer group (informal institutions). We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, they also affect social rules of conduct. Specifically, in clientelist societies with high levels of corruption, social image concerns work in opposition to formal incentives provided by anti-corruption efforts. Applying the theory to data from Puerto Rico's anti-corruption municipal audits program, we find evidence consistent with the idea that anti-corruption measures are less effective due to social spillovers.

In Progress

  • Marriage Penalty and Divorce Premium? Theory and Evidence with F. Aragon
  • Child Penalty and Cultural Gender Norms: Evidence from Canada with F. Aragon
  • Governing by Corruption with G. Schulze and N. Zakharov

Publications

Political Economy & Institutions

Culture & Development

Theory