Research

Work in Progress

Working Papers

Partisanship as a Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

with B. Bühler  ·  2024  ·  Conditionally accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

This paper develops a theory of partisanship as a self-fulfilling prophecy. In a simple dynamic model where officeholders have better information on which policy is best, we show that partisan divergence on policies emerges even though everyone shares identical, non-partisan preferences. If voters associate politicians’ identities (e.g. party affiliations) with their future policy choices, both sides can get caught in a trap of self-fulfilling expectations: because voters expect the identity of officeholders to shape their political actions, politicians are incentivized to act according to their perceived partisan identities, i.e., identities are like ‘sunspots’ that drive subsequent policy choices only because voters think they do. The equilibrium is one of policy persistence, incumbency advantage, and political failure. If voters do not expect officeholders’ identities to determine political actions, in contrast, the equilibrium is one of non-partisanship We also consider some extensions to show robustness of the findings.

Externalities in Politicians' Malfeasance: Norms of Corruption

with G. Bobonis and X. Zhao  ·  CESifo Working Paper No. 11715, 2025  ·  Revise & resubmit, Journal of Development Economics

To what extent can anti-corruption measures serve to limit patronage and corrupt networks effectively and sustainably in clientelist societies with a prevailing norm of corruption? We develop a political agency model in which officeholders are motivated to reduce rent seeking behavior through re-election incentives operating via elections and audits (formal institutions), but also through reputational or self-image concerns that are influenced by the prevailing norm on corruption in their peer group (informal institutions). We show that, while the formal institutions of audits and elections have the desired direct effect of reducing corruption, they also affect social rules of conduct. Specifically, in clientelist societies with high levels of corruption, social image concerns work in opposition to formal incentives provided by anti-corruption efforts. Applying the theory to data from Puerto Rico's anti-corruption municipal audits program, we find evidence consistent with the idea that anti-corruption measures are less effective due to social spillovers.

In Progress

  • Marriage Penalty and Divorce Premium? Theory and Evidence with F. Aragon
  • Child Penalty and Cultural Gender Norms: Evidence from Canada with F. Aragon
  • Governing by Corruption with G. Schulze and N. Zakharov

Publications

Political Economy & Institutions

Culture & Development

Theory